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LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS
TO UNITED STATES-SOVIET TRADE:
SOVIET PERSPECTIVE
.ChristopherOsakwe*
I.

I TRODUCTMON

Traditionally, law, economics, and politics have always been
interrelated elements. Within this interaction economics and politics have often alternated as the leading determinant of future
development, whereas law has acted as an appendage of both or,
at least, as a catalyst for future political and economic changes in
the given society. This analysis of the close interaction between
law, economics, and politics applies not only domestically but also
internationally. If foreign policy is nothing but a continuation of
domestic policy by other means, it follows that the foreign policy
of a particular nation is shaped by a variety of factors including
domestic and international politics. Thus, the conduct of a nation's foreign policy is a multifaceted process that includes diplomatic, economic, cultural, scientific, and technological relations as
well as military operations, if necessary. Within this context, foreign trade is only one of the many instruments utilized in the
conduct of foreign policy. For both the United States and the Soviet Union foreign trade has always been and will continue to be,
to paraphrase Clausewitz, a continuation of political relations by
other means.
Since 1917 United States-Soviet trade has undergone numerous
periods of relative upsurge of decline. During each of these periods,
political and diplomatic factors were most crucial in determining
trade contacts between the two nations. Economic considerations
were sometimes relegated to the background by both parties, particularly by the United States. The present upsurge in United
States-Soviet trade is the result of the decontrol policy initiated by
President Nixon in 1969.' In his inaugural address on January 20,
1969, President Nixon spoke of the dawning of a new era of negotia*Associate Professor of Law, Tulane University; LL.B., 1965, LL.M., 1967,
Ph.D., 1970, Moscow State University; J.S.D., 1974, University of Illinois.
1. For details of these decontrol measures see G. SmrrH, Sovmr FOREIGN
TRADE-ORGANIZATION, OPERATIONS AND POLICY, 1918-1971 (1973).
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tion destined to replace the old policy of confrontation between
Moscow and Washington.2 Between 1969 and 1972, President
Nixon worked relentlessly to give some practical effect to this new
policy, which culminated in the Governments of the United States
and the Soviet Union signing a series of far-reaching agreements
in 1972. Among these agreements were the following: the Basic
Principles of Relation Between the United States and the
U.S.S.R.; 3 Protocol on Expansion of Air Services Between the
United States and U.S.S.R.; 4 Convention on Taxation; 5 Protocol
on Establishment of a U.S.S.R.-United States Chamber of Commerce;' Protocol on Trade Representation; 7 Agreement on Transportation;8 Agreement Regarding the Settlement of Lend Lease,
Reciprocal Aid and Claims;9 Agreement Regarding Certain Maritime Matters.'" The cumulative effect of these agreements paved
the way for the signing of a trade agreement between the two
countries on October 18, 1972.11 The latter agreement, however,
2. The inaugural address of Richard M. Nixon, Jan. 20, 1969. 60 DEP"r STATE
BuLL. 122-23 (1969). The spirit of the address was captured by President Nixon's
Secretary of State, William Rogers, in a speech before the Council on Foreign
Relations at New York City on September 28, 1972, in which he spoke of the
change in United States policy towards the Soviet Union from containment to
engagement. See W. Rogers, From Containment to Engagement, 67 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 470-73 (1972).
3. 11 Ir'LLEGAL MATER LS 756 (1972) [hereinafter cited as I.L.M.].
4. 12 I.L.M. 897 (1973).
5. Id. at 899.
6. Id. at 905.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 910.
9. Lend Lease Settlement with the Soviet Union, Oct. 18, 1972, [1972] 3
U.S.T. 2910, T.I.A.S. No. 7478.
10. Maritime Agreement with the Soviet Union, Oct. 14, 1972, [1972] 4
U.S.T. 3576, T.I.A.S. No. 7513.
11. The signing of the Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Regarding Trade, 67 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 595 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972
Trade Agreement], was accompanied by five exchanges of letters dealing with
the provisions of articles 3, 5 and 6 of the 1972 Trade Agreement itself. For text
of the trade agreement, the exchange of letters and the accompanying Presidential determination making the Soviet Union eligible for credits from the EXIM
Bank of the United States see 67 DEP'T STATE BULL. 581-604 (1972).
A legal analysis of the 1972 Trade Agreement can be found in: Starr, A New
Legal Frameworkfor TradeBetween the United States and the Soviet Union: The
1972 US-USSR Trade Agreement, 67 Am.J. INT'L L. 63-83 (1973); Grzybowski,
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will not become effective until the United States grants the Soviet
Union most-favored-nation (MFN) status as provided in article 1
of the 1972 Trade Agreement.
The long delay over the granting of MFN status to the Soviet
Union notwithstanding," the mere signing of the 1972 Trade
Agreement has raised the volume of trade between the two countries to an unprecedented level. For example, since the signing of
the 1972 Trade Agreement, American exports to the Soviet Union
in 1972, including grain sales, totalled 546.7 million dollars as
against 161.7 million dollars in 1971, while Soviet sales to the
United States reached 95.4 million dollars in 1972 as opposed to
only 57.6 million dollars in 1971. The latest available figures for the
first ten months of 1973 showed that United States exports to the
Soviet Union totalled 1.05 billion dollars with imports from the
Soviet Union standing at 160 million dollars."3 On the whole
United States-Soviet trade has increased sevenfold since 1971. as
evidenced by the financial statements of certain United States
corporations .14

The 1972 Trade Agreement seems to have opened the gates of
United States-Soviet trade, and American businessmen are no
doubt anticipating the prospects for profits, which they hope to
United States-Soviet Union Trade Agreement of 1972, 37 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB.
395-428 (1972); Osakwe, Legal Aspects of Soviet-American Trade: Problems and
Prospects, 48 TuL. L. Ray. 536-59 (1974).
12. The 1972 Trade Agreement has encountered difficulty in the United
States Congress where Title IV, the Jackson Amendment, of the Trade Reform
Act of 1973, H.R. 6767 93d Cong., 1st Sess., §504 (1973) has taken a negative stand
on the granting of MFN status to the Soviet Union. Senator Jackson (D., Wash.)
contends that the United States should deny MFN status to the Soviet Union
until it agrees to relax its emigration practices and allow Soviet Jews to emigrate
freely. After more than a year of sometimes hostile debate on the issue, it now
looks as if an accommodation will be reached on the MFN question between Congress and the Ford Administration. An agreement has been reached to grant MFN
status to the Soviet Union on a temporary basis for a one year period, while
Congress observes the Soviet Union's action on the emigration issue. See Hunt,
Soviet Trade Bill Seems Likely Soon After Compromise, Wall Street J., Aug. 16,
1974, at 11, col. 6. For an overview of the Trade Reform Bill of 1973 and its
potential impact on East-West trade see Gates and Muir, The United States in
Pending World TradeNegotiations, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 609, 623-27 (1974).
13. 76 U.S. NEWS & WoRD RFP., March 4, 1974, No. 9 at 67.
14. 83 NEWSWEEK, Feb. 25, 1974, No. 8 at 43.
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reap from such bilateral trade. So tantalizing are these propsects
that the Yankee trader, traditionally an economic animal, is willing to call upon the United States Government to lift all national
security restrictions on commercial intercourse with the Soviet
Union. The fact remains, however, that international trade is too
serious a business to be left in the hands of businessmen. The
former United States Secretary of Commerce, Mr. Peter G. Petersen, captured this theme when he noted in a 1972 Moscow Press
Conference:
[I]t has been said that war is too important to be left to the
generals. I think it might be said that trade is getting too important
to be left to commercial ministers. For me to suggest that the progress of trade will not be affected by the larger political environment
would be, I think, not to understand that there is relationship between economics and politics. The more favorable the political environment, the more political tensions are reduced, given the kind of
system we have in the United States, the more likely, I think that
the American public, the Congress, and others will support the concept of expanded trade, and support the concept of expanded
credit.1 5
Even though the 1972 Trade Agreement, when it enters into
force, will create a new legal framework for United States-Soviet
trade, it does not, for the most part, supersede the domestic laws
of the sovereigns regarding foreign trade. In other words, the 1972
Trade Agreement was intended only as a legal bridge between the
domestic laws of the United States and the Soviet Union. It is true,
of course, that the 1972 Trade Agreement calls for a modification
of certain aspects of the signatories' domestic legislation when such
a change is necessary. For example, article 1 of the 1972 Trade
Agreement calls for reciprocity in granting MFN status to goods
originating in or exported to each country. To meet this obligation,
the United States has to alter some of its existing statutes that
restrict trade with the Soviet Union.1" For the purpose of deciding
15. The Secretary of Commerce, Peter G. Petersen, who was also the United
States Chairman of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commercial Commission, made
these remarks at a Moscow Press Conference on Aug. 1, 1972, in response to the
question of whether the United States was trying to fuse trade questions with
general political and foreign policy considerations. 67 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 285, 292
(1972).
16. For a review of some of the United States laws that must be amended to
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to amend or retain these various domestic foreign trade laws, each
party, under the 1972 Trade Agreement, is granted certain rights
under article 1, paragraph 3, and article 3 in addition to the right
to protect its national security as provided by article 8. Accordingly, article 2, paragraph 2 of the 1972 Trade Agreement provides
that:
[C]ommercial transactions between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be effected in
accordance with the laws and regulations then current in each country with respect to import and export control and financing as well

as on the basis of contracts to be concluded between natural and
legal persons of the United States of America and foreign trade
organizations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Both Governments shall facilitate, in accordance with the laws and regulations then current in each country, the conclusion of such contracts,
including those on a long-term basis, between natural and legal
persons of the United States of America and foreign trade organizations of the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics. It is understood
that such contracts will generally be concluded on terms customary
in international commercial practice."
This means that any contract between an American corporation
and a Soviet foreign trade organization will be simultaneously regulated by the will of the parties as expressed in the contract itself,
by the pertinent laws of both the United States and the Soviet
Union, by applicable provisions of United States-Soviet trade and
other related agreements, as well as by customary international
law in situations where no contractual or treaty law governs.
This article will discuss only those Soviet laws that have not
been preempted by the 1972 Trade Agreement. To facilitate this
task, these Soviet laws will be discussed under three separate
headings: (1) general principles of Soviet foreign trade, (2) the
legal status of Soviet foreign trade organizations, and (3) the miscellaneous barriers to the improvement of trade relations with the
Soviet Union.
At this point two caveats are in order: first, when the 1972 Trade
Agreement goes into effect, the relationship between the 1972
conform to the 1972 Trade Agreement see PisAR, COXISTENCE. AND CoMMERcEGUIDELINES FOR TRANSACTIONS BE'rwEm EAST AND WFST (1970); SMITH, supra note

1; Osakwe, supra note 11; Starr, supra note 11.
17. 1972 Trade Agreement art. 2, 2.
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Trade Agreement and Soviet laws on foreign trade shall be governed by two related principles of Soviet conflict of laws. The first
principle provides that "[i]f by an international treaty or convention to which the USSR is a party other rules are laid down than
those contained in Soviet civil legislation, then the rules of the
international treaty or convention [will] apply."' 18 The same proposition applies to the territory of the Russian Soviet Federated
Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.). 19 In addition, the second principle
provides that "[a] foreign law is not applied if its application
would be repugnant to the fundamentals of the Soviet system.""0
The second caveat relates to the arbitration clause in the 1972
Trade Agreement by which "[b]oth Governments encourage the
adoption of arbitration for the settlement of disputes arising out
of international commercial transactions concluded between natural persons of the United States of America and foreign trade organizations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, such arbitration to be provided for by agreements in contracts between such
persons and organizations, or, if it has not been so provided, to be
provided for in separate agreements between them in writing executed in the form required for the contract itself."'" Such disputes
between natural persons of the United States and foreign trade
organizations of the Soviet Union may relate not only to the application and interpretation of specific provisions of a traded contract
but also to the compatibility of certain provisions of the trade
agreement with Soviet law.
II.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SovIET FOREIGN TRADE

A.

Basic Concepts

The term "general principles of Soviet foreign trade," refers to
18. R.S.F.S.R. 1961 GRAMzH. KoD. (Civil Code) §568.
19. A. Kiralfy (transl.), The Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure of the
Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) 1964, in LAW INEASTERN EUROPE (1966). [Hereinafter all references to the R.S.F.S.R. Civil Code are
to Kiralfy's translation.]
The same principle that is contained in article 569 of the R.S.F.S.R. Civil Code
can be found in article 169 of Osn. Grazh. Zak. S.S.S.R. i Soiuz. Resp. (1969)
(Fundamental Principles of Civil Legislation), which was promulgated by a law
of the Soviet Union of Dec. 8, 1961. See [1961] 50 Ved. Verk. Soy. S.S.S.R.
(Supreme Soviet U.S.S.R.).
20. R.S.F.S.R. 1961 GRAZ. KOD. (Civil Code) §568.
21. 1972 Trade Agreement art. 7, 1.
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those basic principles of Soviet Government and Communist Party
policy that have found their way into concrete statutes and other
normative enactments regarding the organization and operation of
Soviet foreign trade. Certainly, these general principles cannot all
be placed on the same level of authority, although some are so
fundamental that they may not be compromised under any circumstances. Other principles are flexible enough to be left to the
respective foreign trade organizations for their discretionary application. Within this context there are two distinct categories of
general principles of Soviet foreign trade-the imperative and the
dispositive norms. With regard to imperative norms both the Soviet foreign trade organization and the corresponding foreign trading partner are under an obligation to comply with them to the
fullest. Failure to do so would result in the nullifcation of the
transaction or other possible legal repercussions. On the other
hand, the parties to a foreign trade transaction are relatively free
to adapt the dispositive norms of Soviet foreign trade to suit their
particular transaction. In this analysis, emphasis will be placed on
the imperative norms of Soviet foreign trade.
Before discussing these generalprinciples it is necessary to bear
in mind certain basic facts about the Soviet political and legal
system. First, the Soviet Union is a communist party-state with
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), as the only
official political party. Even though there is a functional division
of the Soviet state into three traditional departments of
government-the legislative, executive, and judicial-with the legislative branch as the most powerful organ, there is no doubt that
the CPSU is superior to all three branches of government, including the legislative. This means that the general principles regulating Soviet foreign trade can be found not only in the normative acts
of the three departments of the Soviet state but also, and perhaps
more importantly, in the resolutions and decisions of the CPSU.
For all practical purposes the CPSU operates as a deus ex machina
and its leadership role22 is felt in all aspects of Soviet life, includ22. Article 126 of the 1936 U.S.S.R. Constitution comes closest to articulating
the preeminent role of the CPSU in the Soviet Society. It states: "[Tihe Communist Party of the Soviet Union. . . is the vanguard of the working people in
their struggle to build communist society and is the leading core of all organizations of the working people, both government and non-government."
KONSTITUTSIYA (Constitution) §126 (U.S.S.R., 1936) [hereinafter cited as
KONST.].
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ing the formulation of Soviet foreign trade policy. Secondly, within
the formal hierarchy of Soviet law, the U.S.S.R. Constitution is
supreme, although on an informal basis, resolutions of the CPSU
take precedence over the provisions of the U.S.S.R. Constitution.
A Soviet trade agreement or any other Soviet treaty that is in
conflict with the U.S.S.R. Constitution is technically invalid,n but
if the same treaty were signed pursuant to a stated CPSU policy,
it will be deemed valid even though it conflicts with a constitutional provision and usually in such a case, the constitution will
be amended to comply with such a treaty obligation. To this extent
the Constitution of the Soviet Union is only a legal instrument
placed at the generous disposal of the CPSU.2
B.

General Principles Governing the Conduct of Soviet Foreign
Trade

1. Official Recognition of the Close Interplay of Foreign Trade
and ForeignPolicy.-In the conduct of its foreign trade the Soviet
Union does not apply the same standards to all trading partners.
Rather, categorizing the community of nations into three major
groups for foreign policy purposes, the Soviet Union applies different standards in its trade with countries of the socialist, capitalistic, and neutral (Third World) camps. At its 23rd Congress, the
CPSU enumerated the following basic principles underlying Soviet
foreign trade: (a) complete equality on all sides, (b) respect for the
state and national security of trading partners, (c) non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, and (d) mutual
benefit and conscientious fulfillment of all obligations. In addition
23. The supremacy of the U.S.S.R. Constitution over all other laws and treaties of the Soviet Union is implied in articles 14, paragraph (d); 20; and 69 of the
U.S.S.R. Constitution. KONST. §§14(d), 20, 69. Hereinafter, all references to the
U.S.S.R. Constitution are to the 1936 Constitution, as amended.
24. Whether Leonid Brezhnev, the First Secretary of the CPSU, can validly
sign an international agreement on behalf of the Soviet Union, in the light of the
fact that he is not a member of the Government, is an academic question. A
member of the Government he may not be, but in reality he has the inherent
authority to represent the Soviet Union in any international transaction and his
signature on any Soviet treaty is not only valid but, as is often the case, carries
more political weight and indicates the significance that the Soviet Union attaches to such an agreement or treaty.
25. For an analysis of the juridicial nature of Socialist Constitution see
CONsTrru'rIONS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY-STATES V-Vi

(J. Triska ed.

1968).
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to these general principles, however, Soviet foreign trade with
each of the three trading camps or zones is governed by special
rules designed for those particular countries. Whereas
"[e]conomic, scientific, and technical ties of the Soviet Union
with other socialist countries, [were] aimed at further strengthening the community and consistently promoting the economic integration of the [COMECON] countries. . . development of stable
external economic, scientific, and technical ties with developing
Asian, African, and Latin American countries shall be continued
on terms of mutual benefit and in the interest of strengthening of
their economic independence. ' ' 26 On the other hand, the Soviet
trade policy with capitalist countries is to enter into "economically
justified commercial, scientific, and technical contacts with those
industrially developed capitalistic countries which show willingness to develop cooperation with the Soviet Union in these
spheres."' ' In other words, when trading with the capitalist countries of the West, the Soviet Union professes to seek no political
gains from such trade. Rather, the Soviet decision to trade with
any particular nation in this capitalistic bloc will depend essentially on economic considerations and on the willingness of the
Western nation to trade with the Soviet Union on equal terms. The
Soviet Union will neither attempt to use such trade relations to
extract political concessions from such a state nor, for its part,
yield to political pressure from any Western nations. On its face
this attitude differs from the underlying policy of Soviet trade with
the Socialist and Third World nations. Consistent with the Soviet
concept of trading blocs, article 1 of the 1972 Trade Agreement,
which deals with the reciprocal granting of MFN status, allows for
this policy of preferential trading zones.2
2. State Monopoly of Foreign Trade.2 9-The decree of April 22,
1918, entitled "Decree on the Nationalization of Foreign Trade"
26. 1971 VNESHNiAIA TORGOVLIA (Foreign Trade) No. 4, at 5 quoted in SMrU,
supra note 1 at 30.
27. Id.
28. 1972 Trade Agreement, art. 1, 13.
29. For a general review of the domestic organization of Soviet-foreign trade
see PisAR, supra note 16, at 141-60; Hertzfeld, Foreign Trade, I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
SovIET LAW 280-82 (F. Feldbrugge ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as ENCYCLOPEDIA];
Quigley, Soviet Foreign Trade Agencies Abroad: A Note, 37 LAw & CoNwmP.
PROB. 465-73 (1972).
30. It might be of historical interest to note that the original idea for the
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represented the first Soviet decree to proclaim the principle of
state monopoly of foreign trade.3" Article 1 of this decree provides:
"All foreign trade is nationalized. Trade transactions for the purchase or sale of any product [of the extracting and processing
industry, of agriculture, etc.] with foreign states or individual
trading enterprises abroad shall be carried out in the name of the
Russian Republic by specially authorized agencies. Apart from
these agencies, all trade transactions with foreign countries for
import or export are prohibited."" This was followed by the provision of article 2, which stipulates that "[tihe Peoples' Commissariat of Trade and Industry shall be the agency in charge of the
Nationalized foreign trade." Even though the 1918 decree
avoided the use of the term "monopoly," such meaning was inferred since it granted to the Soviet state the exclusive and unmitigated right to conduct all Soviet foreign trade operations through
designated state agencies.
nationalization of Soviet foreign trade (which was allegedly initiated by Mikhail
Larin, a leading Bolshevik radical economic reformer and strongly supported by
V.I. Lenin) met with strong opposition from other leading members of the Bolshevik Party. Even after the policy was promulgated in April 1918, the antimonopolists continued to resist the idea until it was irreversibly entrenched into the Soviet
system by a Decree of the 9th All-Russian Congress of Soviets in Dec. 1921.4 Sob.
Uzak. i. Rasp. R.S.F.S.R., [1922] Item 43, art. 11. For a short history of the
origins and the official reasons for this new policy see G. KALMZHNAIA, PRAVoVYE
FORMI MONOPOLH VNESHNEI TORGOVLI SSSR V IKH ISTORICHESKOM RAZVITII (The

Legal Forms of the Monopoly of Foreign Trade of the U.S.S.R. in their Historical
Development) (1951). D. MISHUSTN, SOTSLkSTICHESKAIA MONOPOLHA VNFSHNEI

TORGOVIU SSSR (Socialist Monopoly of Foreign Trade of the U.S.S.R.) (1938); J.
QUIGLEY, THE SovIEr FoREIGN TRADE MONOPOLY-INsTTrUTIONS AND LAws 3-36
(1974); Kovan, Pravovye Problemy Ustanovlenia Monopolii Vneshnei Torgovli
Sovetskogo Gosudarstva (Legal Problems Connected with the Establishment of
Monopoly of Foreign Trade of the Soviet State), Soy. Y.B. INT'L L. 290-300 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Kovan].
One Soviet commentator claims that Lenin was the author of the idea of a
Soviet monopoly of foreign trade and specifically cites two of Lenin's writings to
document the claim: GroziashchaiaKatastrofai kak s nei borot'sia (Impending
catastrophy and how to battle it-was written on the eve of the October
Revolution of 1917), and Ocherednye ZadachiSovetskoi valsti (The next tasks of

the Soviet Power-written somewhere between March-April of 1918). Kovan, at
290-91.
31. 33 Sob. Uzak. i Rasp. R.S.F.S.R. [1918] Item 432.
32. 33 Sob. Uzak. i Rasp. R.S.F.S.R. [1918] Item 432, art. 1.
33. 33 Sob. Uzak. i Rasp. R.S.F.S.R. [1918] Item 432, art. 2.
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The spirit of the 1918 decree was reiterated in a 1922 decree,M
which for the first time used the term "monopoly" to refer to the
authority of the state in the conduct of Soviet foreign trade, stating
that "the foreign trade of the RSFSR shall be a state monopoly."3 5
Despite the unequivocal language of the 1922 decree, the exact
scope of this state monopoly remained unclear. The question that
persisted was whether the two decrees precluded private agencies
from engaging in any form of foreign trade transactions. In October
1925, the Central Committee of the CPSU adopted a resolution3 6
rendering an interpretation of the concept of "state monopoly of
foreign trade." The resolution provided in part:
Its essence [the monopoly's] is that the state itself carries out
management of foreign trade through a specially created agency
(the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade); establishes which
organizations may carry out actual foreign trade operations in which
branches and in what volumes, determines working for the goals of
improving the economy and socialist construction by means of an
export-import plan, what and in what quantities may be exported
from the country and what may be imported into it; and it directly
regulates import and export and the operations of foreign trade organizations through a system of licenses and quotas. 7
The 1925 interpretative resolution of the Central Committee of
the CPSU has been construed by a student of Soviet foreign trade
"to mean that the conduct of foreign trade by non-commissariat
government agencies and even by private companies does not violate the monopoly principle, so long as all trade is closely regulated
by the state. '3 The latter interpretation, however, may be correct
only in the context and circumstances of the 1920's. At that time
there were still mixed trading companies in the Soviet Union,
while under the present conditions in the Soviet Union such an
34. Decree on Foreign Trade of March 13, 1922, 24 Sob. Uzak. i Rasp.
R.S.F.S.R. [1922] Item 266 Presidium of the All-Union Central Executive Committee. For a detailed enumeration of subsequent decrees, which were aimed at
reasserting the principle promulgated in the 1918 and 1922 decrees see Kovan,
supra note 30, at 295-300.
35. 24 Sob. Uzak. i Rasp. R.S.F.S.R. [1922] Item 266.
36. Resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the WorkerPeasant Party (Bolsheviks) on Foreign Trade, October 5, 1925, reproduced in
QUIGLEY, supra note 30, at 205-10.
37. Cited in QUIGLEY, supra note 30, at 74.
38. QUIGLEY, supra note 30, at 74.
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interpretation would not be applicable, especially since article 14,
paragraph (h) of the U.S.S.R. Constitution speaks of an uncompromising state monoply of foreign trade. Similarly, the limitations on the uses of personal property" under article 10 of the
U.S.S.R. Constitution would not permit private involvement in
the sphere of foreign trade. Therefore, it seems to this writer that
under the present state monopoly principle, only the Soviet state
or any authorized subdivision thereof may engage in foreign trade
operations, including not only export-import operations but also
foreign currency transactions 0 as well as the insurance" of exportimport goods and transport.
Through the mechanism of state monopoly of foreign trade the
Soviet Government strives not only to exclude all competing private interests from this vital area, but also to insure the coordination of its foreign trade policy with its overall domestic and foreign
policy. In the words of one Western commentator, "[e]very segment of Russian . . .business life is entirely monopolized, both
horizontally and vertically. At home and abroad the omnipresent
state operates on an exclusive and gigantic scale as owner, inves39. The 1936 U.S.S.R. Constitution recognizes only three types of property
interests: state, cooperative and collective farm (article 5), and personal property
(article 10). Private property, per se, is unconstitutional in the U.S.S.R.
40. See Statute of U.S.S.R. State Bank, 18 Sbor. Post. Prav. S.S.S.R. [1960]
Item 160. All foreign currency transactions are concentrated in the hands of the
U.S.S.R. State Bank which by a decree of April 3, 1954, was removed from the
jurisdiction of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Finance. See Decree of April 3, 1954,
[1954] 9 Ved. Verkh. Sov. S.S.S.R.; [1968] 1 Sbor. Zak. S.S.S.R. at 282. In
foreign financial transactions, the U.S.S.R. State Bank operates in close collaboration with the Vneshtorgbank S.S.S.R., the Foreign Trade Bank of the U.S.S.R.,
which specifically deals with foreign trade finance. For details see, Winter,
Banking, I ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 29, at 76-77. For detailed regulation of
banking and loan operations in the U.S.S.R. see articles 269-74, 391-95 of
R.S.F.S.R. GRAZH. KOD. (Civil Code) as well as the corresponding provisions of
Osn. Grazh. Zak. S.S.S.R. i Soiuz. Resp. (Fundamental Principles of Civil Legislation).
41. A decree of November 28, 1918, nationalized all insurance operations in
the Soviet Union. Whereas all domestic insurance business is concentrated in the
hands of an agency called GosudarstvennoeStrakhovanie (Gosstrakh), all foreign
trade insurance business is entrusted to another agency called InostrannoeGosudarstvennoeStrakhovanie (popularly known as Ingosstrakh). For details see Rudden, Insurance, I ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 29 at 323-26; Rudden, Soviet Insurance Law, 12 LAW INEASTERN EuRoPE (1966).
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tor, miner, buyer, producer, moneylender, shipper and insurer."4
3. The Conduct of Foreign Trade Through State Operational
Agencies. -The effective implementation of state monopoly on foreign trade calls for the concentration of authority in one governmental agency. In the Soviet Union such authority is vested in the
Ministry of Foreign Trade (MFT)4 3 which is solely responsible for
the overall coordination of Soviet foreign trade.4 This agency's
constitutional authority is derived from a host of provisions in the
1936 U.S.S.R. Constitution such as article 14, paragraph (h) which
proclaims the principle of exclusive federal jurisdiction over foreign trade matters and articles 75 and 77, which grant the exercise
of this exclusive jurisdiction to the all-union ministry of foreign
trade. The head of this ministry, designated the Minister of Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union, is empowered, under articles 72
and 73 of the U.S.S.R. Constitution, to direct and coordinate all
questions connected with foreign trade. It is true that the minister
often consults with a ministerial collegiate (an advisory body comprised of the minister as the ex officio chairman, his deputy ministers, and other top executives within the Ministry of Foreign
Trade) 5 on major policy matters, but under article 16 of the General Statute on U.S.S.R. Ministries, the ultimate responsibility for
making the decisions rests with the minister himself. 4 This, how42. Pisar, Crossroadsfor The Multinationals,Wall Street J., June 26, 1974,
at 14, Col. 4.
43. The Ministry of Foreign Trade of the U.S.S.R. was created by a decree of
August 24, 1953. See [1968] 1 Sbor. Zak. S.S.S.R. 268.

44. The Customs Code of the U.S.S.R., which was adopted on May 5, 1964,
and became effective on July 1, of that year, charges the Central Customs Admin-

istration with the direct supervision of all customs operations within the Soviet
Union (article 2 of the Customs Code). But article 1 of the Code establishes the
Central Customs Administration as a subordinate agency of the MFT thus giving
the latter the right to control all Soviet customs operations. See Customs Code

of the U.S.S.R., [1968] 1 Sbor. Zak. S.S.S.R. 338-62.
45.

Admittedly, in several of its provisions, the General Statute on U.S.S.R.

Ministries seeks to preserve the relative autonomy of the various ministerial
collegiates. (See articles 15 and 18 of the General Statute.) These safeguards,

however, do not often work out in practice.
46.

General Statute on U.S.S.R. Ministries was promulgated by a decree of

the Council of Ministries of the U.S.S.R. on July 10, 1967. Article 17 of the
Statute enumerates the specific powers that are delegated to the Minister. An
English translation of this statute can be found in BERmAN &QUIGLEY, BASIc LAws
ON THE STRucTuRE OF THE Sovwr STATUTE 83-97 (1969).
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ever, does not empower the minister of foreign trade with absolute
power in the area of foreign trade, for institutional checks on his
authority can be found in the General Statute on U.S.S.R. Ministries.4"
Up to the mid-1950's, the Ministry of Foreign Trade's monopoly
over Soviet foreign trade was unmitigated and pervasive, but with
the subsequent decentralization of the Soviet economic apparatus
some of the tasks of the Ministry of Foreign Trade were passed on
to other ancillary state agencies. The most prominent of these
agencies are the State Committee of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers for Foreign Economic Relations, which was created in 195748
as a replacement for the now defunct Chief Administration for
Economic Relations with Countries of Peoples' Democracy; and
the Committee on Inventions and Discoveries, which was formed
in 195511 and charged with the patenting of Soviet inventions
abroad. This technical function is to be shared, however, with the
MFT and the State Committee of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers for Coordination of Scientific Research Work, 0 which was superseded by the State Committee for Science and Technology" in
1965. All of the above state agencies work in close collaboration
47. For such checks see articles 1 and 12 of the General Statute on U.S.S.R.
Ministries. Id. at 83, 86.
48. See [19571 15 Ved. Verkh. Soy. S.S.S.R. Item 388.
49. See art. 3, (a) of the Statute on the Committee on Inventions and Discoveries of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, promulgated by a decree of the
U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, No. 274, Feb. 23, 1956. The authority of the committee was subsequently expanded in 1961 to include the sale abroad of licenses
to Soviet products as well as the right to go before the Council of Ministers with
a positive recommendation to purchase licenses to foreign products. See article 6
of the Methodological Instructions on the Procedure for preparing Materials on
the Sale and Purchase of Licenses Abroad which was promulgated by a decree of
the Committee on Inventions and Discoveries of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers on Dec. 19, 1961.
50. See Edict of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet of April 8,
1961, [1961] 15 Ved. Verkh. Soy. S.S.S.R. Item 167; See also Statute on the
State Committee of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers For Coordination of
Research Work [1961] 20 Sbor. Post. Pray. S.S.S.R. Item 148, promulgated by
a decree of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, Law of Dec. 23, 1961.
51. See Law of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., October 2, 1965 [1969]
39 Ved. Verkh. Soy. S.S.S.R. Item 558. The Committee was recognized under a
new statute, which was promulgated on October 1, 1966. See [1966] 21 Sbor.
Post. Prav. S.S.S.R., Item 193.
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with the MFT. Among the other state and social organizations that
operate outside the sphere of, but not necessarily in competition
with, the MFT are: the State Planning Committee of the U.S.S.R.
Council of Ministers, popularly known as the GOSPLAN, which
acts as a conduit between the MFT and the Soviet federal parliament; the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Finance, which plans the currency
limits to be placed on the foreign purchases of the MFT; the state
agency for foreign insurance, known as Ingosstrakh, which is
charged with all matters related to cargo insurance; the State
Bank of the U.S.S.R., which coordinates all Soviet foreign currency transactions; the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Merchant Marine
which, under the provisions of the U.S.S.R. Merchant Marine
Code of 1968,52 is charged with the responsibility for all Soviet
maritime shipping operations but collaborates with the MFT in
matters related to international shipping; the All-Union Chamber
of Commerce, which acts as the promotional agent for Soviet foreign trade organizations (FTO's) and also operates two arbitration
tribunals-the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission (FTAC) 3
and the Maritime Arbitration Commission. The MFT also develops contacts with international, regional and national economic
organizations, exchanges trade delegations with foreign countries,
and renders translation services to Soviet FTO's.
4. Use of Trade Delegations.-Becauseof the principle of state
foreign trade monopoly, the Soviet Government entrusts to its var52. U.S.S.R. Merchant Marine Code, adopted by a decree of Sept. 17, 1968.
See [1971] 3 Sbor. Zak. S.S.S.R. 42-111.
53. The Soviet Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission (FTAC) is a very peculiar institution, which was established in 1932 at the instigation of a handful of
Soviet organizations. It is not a state agency, but rather is regarded as a social
organization. Like all the other recognized social organizations in the Soviet
Union (e.g. the CPSU, trade union organizations, the Young Communist League,
the Znanie Society, etc.) it enjoys the full support of the Soviet Government.
Even though it is not a state agency it was chartered by a joint act of the Central
Exe cutive Committee and the Council of Peoples' Commissariats of the USSR
which was promulgated on July 17, 1932. Any agreement by a Soviet FTO to
arbitrate before the FTAC has the force of law in the Soviet Union and the
decisions of the FTAC itself is binding at law. For details on the juridical status
and a review of the activities of the FTAC see Ramzaitsev, Deiatel'nost' VTAK
v Moskve v 1957goduy (Activities of the FTAC in Moscow during 1957), Soy. Y.B.
INT'L L. 463-75 (1958).
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ious foreign-based trade delegations54 the task of soliciting business
for the numerous Soviet FTO's. Further, these trade delegations
also serve as information gathering instruments for the Soviet
MFT. For some time the legal status of the trade delegations was
unclear, thereby presenting such issues as, inter alia, whether the
officials of the trade delegation enjoyed traditional diplomatic
immunity, whether the delegation itself was immune from court
actions in a host country, and whether the delegation was a general
or special agent of the FTO's on whose behalf it occasionally purported to enter into trade contracts. In response to the uncertain
status, the 1972 Trade Agreement attempted to define the powers
of any Soviet trade delegation that would operate within the territory of the United States at any time in the future.5
Soviet trade delegations operate in close cooperation with the
respective FTO's at home, to the extent that whenever the representative of an FTO visits a foreign country the Soviet trade representative in that country acts as his "local counsel" on both the
foreign trade laws of the host country and on the foreign trade laws
of the Soviet Union. Further, whenever an FTO signs a trade contract with a foreign country in the Soviet Union, it is traditional
for the PTO to deposit a copy of that agreement with the Soviet
trade representative residing in the contracting country. Therefore, three functions characterize the role of Soviet trade delegations abroad: (1) as a local counsel to visiting FTo officials, (2) as
a depository for trade agreements, and (3) as a travelling salesman
for the FTO's.56
5. Separation of Foreign Trade from Domestic Trade.Clearly, control of Soviet foreign trade is almost totally separated
57
from that of domestic trade. Whereas the all-union ministry of
foreign trade is charged with the coordination and direction of all
54. An historical analysis of the role of trade delegations in the conduct of
Soviet foreign trade is found in Quigley, supra note 29, at 465-73.
55. See Annex I and IV of the Trade Agreement which respectively defines
the status of the trade representation of the U.S.S.R. in the United States and
the status of the United States Commercial Office in the Soviet Union.
56. In those countries where the activities of the Soviet trade delegation are
not regulated by any specific trade agreement, the powers of the trade delegation
may even include the right to sign trade agreements on behalf of a Soviet FTO.
See QUIGLEY, supra note 30, at 87-92.
57. Under the Soviet constitutional system there are four categories of minis-
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Soviet foreign trade, the conduct of domestic trade is entrusted
to the union-republican and autonomous-republican ministries
of trade. Such a bureaucratic separation of foreign and domestic
trade operations has certain disadvantages. First, such separation leads to a lack of coordination in the planning of domestic
and foreign trade. For example, Soviet foreign trade organizations have been known to export commodities that were badly
needed by the domestic market 8 Also in the sphere of foreign
trade operations occasional conflicts have arisen between competing FTO's over import policies. 9 Furthermore, the separation of
domestic and foreign trade operations tends to insulate the foreign
trader from the producing and consuming Soviet enterprises,
thereby requiring all contracts between the foreign trader and Soviet primary producers to be channeled through a competent FTO,
which could be frustrating for the Western businessman." Moreover, such a bifurcated system may create difficulties in seeking
legal redress, for as one commentator noted:
Under the monopoly foreign trade system, Soviet enterprises
never enter into direct contractual relations with foreign parties.
Therefore, if a foreign purchaser violates a contractual obligation,
he is sued by the [FTO] not by the producing enterprise. And if
the purchaser alleges breach on the Soviet side, he sues the [FTO]
alone. Suits between the [FTO] and supplier are normally kept
quite separate from any suit between the [FTO] and the foreign
purchaser. If an [FTO] pays damages to the purchaser as a result
tries: (1) all-union ministries (these are ministries that exist only at the federal
level, see article 77 of U.S.S.R. Constitution); (2) union-republican ministries
(these exist both at the federal and union-republican levels, see article 78 of
U.S.S.R. Constitution); (3) republican ministries (these exist at the level of
union-republics only, see article 51 of R.S.F.S.R. Constitution); (4) autonomousunion-republican ministries (these exist both at the levels of the union-republic
and the autonomous republics, article 69 of R.S.F.S.R. Constitution). Whereas
the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade exists only at the federal level, the ministry
of trade (domestic) exists at all three levels of sovereign power-federal, unionrepublic, and autonomous-republic.
58. For an account of one such instance see QUmLEY, supra note 30, at 54.
59. Id. Such interagency competition was condemned by the CPSU in its
directives issued at the 24th Congress. See High Authority of the CPSU, 24th
Cong., - Sess., Doc. No.
, - Dues. - (1971).
60. The relationship between the FTO's and the domestic enterprises is vividly described by Quiom, supra note 30, at 127-53.
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of the supplier's improper performance, the [FTO] brings a separate action against the supplier in state arbitrazh. 1
It should be added, however, that even though foreign and domestic trade are separated, the former is not necessarily excluded
from the overall national economic plan. As a matter of fact, Soviet
foreign trade is determined by the demands of the national economic plans at all stages. For example, the adoption of the ninth
five-year economic plan (1971-75) by the CPSU during its 24th
Congress meant that Soviet foreign trade priorities during that
period will be determined strictly in the light of the economic plan
itself." Articulating this fact, the CPSU stated in its directive that
"the development of our foreign trade and the extension of our
economic, scientific, and technical cooperation with other countries should promote the successful fulfillment of the tasks of the
6' 3
new five-year plan period.
The above cited examples are among some of the imperative
norms of Soviet foreign trade. All of these general principles have
found specific articulation in constituent instruments of the various FTO's, as well as in other state laws relative to the authority
of the FTO. A closer analysis of the delegated powers of the FTO
is the subject of the next section of this study. In looking at these
powers it should be borne in mind that the powers of an FTO are
essentially enumerated powers. This is not to say that FTO's do
not have implied or inherent powers; rather, their implied powers
flow specifically from those enumerated in their constituent instruments or in other relevant acts, and accordingly, powers not enumerated may not be freely implied.
III.

LEGAL STATUS OF THE

A.

FTO's64

Introduction

The FTO is at the very center of all Soviet foreign trade opera61. Id. at 144.
62. For a brief but penetrating discussion of the integration of foreign trade
operations into overall economic planning, see Hertzfeld, Export and Import, I
ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 29, at 263-64.
63. See High Authority of the CPSU, supra note 59, at 201.
64. Different Western authors have called the FTO's by different names:
export-import corporations (Pism, supra note 16); monopoly corporations (S=rr,
supra note 1, at 9); monopoly export-import corporations (id. at 8); export-import
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tions, and while numbering approximately 54, FTO's account for
over 95 per cent of all Soviet foreign trade. 5 One research study
shows that "of the fifty-four FTO's presently operating, six specialize in trade with developing countries and are subordinate not to
the Foreign Trade Ministry, but to the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations; six others are subordinate neither to the
Foreign Trade Ministry nor to the state committee but to agencies
whose primary concern is the domestic economy; five FTO's perform service functions for other FTO's; and three specialize by
countries rather than products."6
Within the context of Soviet law the FTO's enjoy the status of
juridical persons." However, in a legal system where there is no
private enterprise and where all juridical persons engaged in foreign trade are subdivisions of the state, it is necessary to shed some
light on the scope of the legal personality conferred on the FTO's
by Soviet law. The remainder of this section discusses the juridical
status of FTO's.
B.
1.

Specializationof FTO's

Commodity Specialization.-The FTO's, whether directly

combines (QUIGLEY, supra note 30); FTO (Starr, supra note 11). Pisar in his book
(PisAR, supra note 16) used more than three different terms to refer to the same
entity: export-import corporations (id. at 147), foreign trade corporations (id. at
147), export-import enterprises (id. at 148); Hertzfeld speaks of all-union foreign
trade corporations (Hertzfeld, supra note 29, at 280); Professor Kiralfy speaks of
external trade associations (Kiralfy, supra note 19); Professor Adahl spoke of
foreign trade firms (I ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 29, at 328); Parsons spoke of state
trading organizations (Parsons, Recent Development in East-West Trade: The
US Perspective, 37 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRo. 548, 553 (1972)). Official translations
by both the United States and Soviet Governments have used the term FTO (see
67 DEP'T STATE BULL. 581-604 (1972); High Authority of the CPSU, supra note
59, at 201). These differences in translation notwithstanding it should be noted
that all references are to the same agency-the Vneshtorgovye Ob'edineniia as
opposed to the Proizvodstvennye Predpriiatiia(domestic primary producers).
65. For a list of the existing FTO's see Osakwe, supra note 11, at 554-59;
QUIGLEY, supra note 30, at 212-15.
66.

See QUIGLEY, supra note 30, at 105.

67. A brief but comprehensive analysis of the juridical status of Soviet FTO's
under Soviet law can be found in Ramzaitsev, Znachenie Novykh Zakonov SSSR
v Oblasti Grazhdanskogo Prava i Protsessa Dlia Regulirovaniia Sovetskykh
Vneshneekonomicheskykh Otnoshenii (The Significance of New Laws of the
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engaged in the export or import of goods or in the provision of
ancillary services to other FTO's, specialize in'specific commodities or services. Therefore, an FTO that specializes in one group of
commodities may not transact in any other unauthorized items.
For example, the Novoesport specializes in carpets, jewelry, and
handicraft only, whereas Promsyrimport, on the other hand,
specializes in pig iron, ferrous alloys, and other steel products.
Also, whereas Sovexportfilm specializes only in films, the
Sojuzprushnina specializes in furs, bristles, and animal hair as
well as organizing fur auctions and concluding long-term agreements for deliveries of fur goods to foreign firms." One of the best
known of the FTO's is the Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, which specializes in books, periodicals, newspapers, pictures, maps, gramophone records, postage stamps, and film strips as well as engaging
in book publication.
The commodities list of each FTO is established by the Minister
of Foreign Trade and is generally included in the FTO's constituent instrument. 9 Only the Minister of Foreign Trade may alter this
list once it has been adopted, thereby granting the FTO an absolute monopoly over foreign trade transactions related to all items
on its commodities list. In this sense, the FTO's are monopolies
within monopolies. 0
It might, however, be consoling to the American businessman to
know that a recent survey 7' showed that not one Soviet FTO has
been found to exceed its authorized power in its foreign trade
transactions-an indication that the foreign trader can safely rely
on the FTO's unilateral claim as to the scope of its authority. A
second point to be noted is that even though a Soviet FTO may
not transact in commodities or services not enumerated in its
charter, an ad hoc authorization from the Ministry of Foreign
Trade will be sufficient authority to enable an FTO to exceed its
U.S.S.R. in the area of Civil Law and Procedure For the Regulation of Soviet
Foreign Economic Relations), Soy. Y.B. IN'L L. 407-17 (1963).
68. For a list of the special commodities in which the various FTO's may
transact see Osakwe, supra note 11, at 554-59.
69. An example of such detailed enumeration of the powers of an FTO can
be found in article 5 of Stankoimport, 8 VNESmA.Ar

61-62 (1966).
70. PisAR, supra note 16, at 147.
71. Ramzaitsev, supra note 53, at 408.

TORGOVUA (Foreign Trade)
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charter limitations. A leading Soviet commentator writes:
Presumably, it is not excluded, that with the permission of the
Ministry of Foreign Trade which is charged with the implementation of state monopoly on foreign trade, an FTO may enter into
foreign trade transactions in those commodities or services that are
not listed in its charter. In such a case, however, the transaction
may not be considered ultra vires so long as the permission (or the
directive) of the MFT may be looked upon as the granting of
[additional] authority to the FTO in excess of the latter's special
agency powers.72
2. Country Specialization.-While most of the FTO's specialize in commodities, at least three, the Dalintorg,Lenfintorg, and
Vostokintorg, specialize in countries or trading zones. The
Dalintorg specializes in coastal exports and imports between the
Far East regions of the Soviet Union and Japan, while the
Lenfintorg trades in consumer goods with Finland and Norway,
and the Vostokintorg specializes in rolled metal products, cement,
glass, timber, and imports wool, cotton, coffee beans, and traditional goods from the Far and Near East. The practical implication
of the geographical limitations on the operations of these three
FTO's is that they may not engage in foreign trade business with
any other countries outside their zonal jurisdiction.
3. Service Specialization.-Another category of FTO's are
those that do not engage in export or import transactions directly
but merely confine their operations to providing ancillary services
to other FTO's. For example, the Vneshtorgreklama merely contracts with other FTO's to provide them with commercial advertisements both at home and abroad, 73 while the Vneshtorgizdat
through its periodic publication,
seeks to educate the other FTO's,
74
about foreign trade operations.
C.

Scope of FTO Autonomy

1. Degree of FinancialAutonomy.-The FTO's are subdivisions of the state but at the same time they are considered separate
legal entities. 75 They are allotted a certain amount of financial and
72.

Id.

73.

Charter of Vneshtorgreklama, 7

74.
75.

Charter of Vneshtorgizdat, 9 VNFsHmLuA TORGOVLA 45 (1964).
See Charter of Stankoimport art. 1, 8 VNsHNA TORGovLA 61-62 (1966).

VNESHNLA

TORGovLA 50-51 (1965).
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material resources from the state budget for a given period of
time,7" during which they are expected to operate at a profit. In all
their operations they are expected to give a full accounting to a
designated state authority. Under this principle of economic accountability an FTO may not be held liable for the obligations of
the Soviet State, or for that matter, for the obligations of another
FT02 7 Similarly, the Soviet state per se cannot be held liable for
the obligations of the FTO. The FTO may sue and be sued in its
own name,78 with its liability limited to its assigned assets. Moreover, it may acquire or lease property both in the Soviet Union or
abroad and it may participate in mixed companies."
2. Degree of Administrative Autonomy.-Even though the
FTO enjoys some degree of financial autonomy from the state, it
is generally subject to administrative control from above, especially since an FTO is generally created by an act of the Council
of Ministries upon the recommendation of the Minister of Foreign
Trade. Further, it takes an act of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, upon the recommendation of the Minister of Foreign Trade,
to merge, break up, or liquidate an FTO. The FTO is subject to
additional administrative control since the top officials of an FTO,
including the Chairman, his deputies and other members of the
FTO collegiate, are appointed and removed by an order of the
Minister of Foreign Trade.
76. The property assigned to an FTO does not belong to the recipient FTO
but rather is merely passed on to the FTO's "operative management." The property in the hands of the FTO's is still state property and, therefore, may be
utilized by the FTO only in accordance with its defined purpose and within the
limits established by law. For the pertinent laws regulating the uses of such
property see U.S.S.R. F.P. Civ. L. arts. 19-32.
77. Charter of Stankoimport art. 2, supra note 69.
78. Since the foreign exporter or importer does not have direct contacts with
the Soviet primary producer or domestic wholesaler, any such foreign company
that violates a contractual obligation is sued not by the Soviet domestic primary
producer or wholesaler but rather by the appropriate Soviet FTO. Similarly, if
the foreign corporation alleges violation of the terms of the contract it sues the
FTO. If the FTO suffers any damage from such foreign suits (e.g., as a result of
the Soviet primary producer's improper performance), it then may bring separate
action against the primary producer in a state arbitrazh.See Law No. 25 of Jan.
26, 1960, Order of the Minister of Foreign Trade, art. 8 [1960].
79. A typical provision regulating the power of an FTO in these matters is
article 6 of the Charter of Stankoimport, supra note 69.
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Requirements for Making Valid FTO Contracts

1. Soviet Formalities.-For the contract"0 of an FTO to be valid
at law, it must conform to certain formalities established under
Soviet law: all such contracts must be in writing and must be
signed by two persons-one shall be the chairman of the FTO or
his deputy and the other a person authorized to sign foreign trade
transactions; bills of exchange and other monetary obligations issued by the FTO in Moscow must have the signature of the FTO's
chairman or his deputy and that of the FTO's chief accountant.
In the event that an FTO is required to conclude a foreign trade
transaction or issue bills of exchange or other monetary obligations
outside Moscow, either within the territory of the Soviet Union or
abroad, these transactions must be signed by two persons who have
been granted a power of attorney by the FTO's chairman."'
The implications of these procedural requirements are that no
oral contracts are permissible, contracts may not be concluded
through the tacit acquiescence of the parties, contract offers must
be made in writing, and any subsequent modifications of an existing contract must conform to the formalities governing the signing
of a new contract. These restrictive rules, requiring two signatures
and precluding oral contracts, would certainly tend to work a hardship on a foreign party who may be used to a more casual way of
doing business. Speaking in general terms about the requirements
of form in East European foreign trade contracts, one commentator has noted that "[a]greements concluded by handshake or telephone, or which are confirmed by telex or cable, are always risky.
In dealings with communist enterprises they are in danger of being
declared unenforceable, even invalid. If the parties intend to reduce their contract to writing but fail to do so, the bargain they
have struck will not be legally binding; this is a fairly universal
rule." 8 2 The commentator's advice to the prospective Western
businessman is that:
80. For a general discussion of the nature and functions of Soviet foreign trade
contracts see Hertzfeld, Foreign Trade Contracts,I ENCYCLOPEDiA, supra note 29,
at 283-84.
81. See Law No. 1 of Dec. 26, 1935, Procedure for Signing Foreign Trade
Transactions, [1936] 1 Sbor. Zak. S.S.S.R. Item 3, art. 2. See also Charter of
Stankoimport, art. 10, 8 VNEsHNLuA TORGovUA 61-62 (1960).
82. PIsAR, supra note 16, at 302.
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[b]oth the original agreement and the subsequent variation of its
terms should be fully documented. If changes, made face to face or
by telephone, result in additional costs for the Western firm, there
is likely to be no recovery in the absence of subsequent confirmation
of amendatory protocol, letter, telex or cable. Most important, an
oral agreement to arbitrate contractual disputes will likewise prove
to be inoperative, leaving the private firm to seek remedy in a communist People's Court. By the same token, an award entered in a
Western country pursuant to an unrecorded arbitral submission
may be denied enforcement in the country of the unsuccessful state
trade.83
Moreover, it is irrelevant whether the contract was executed in
the Soviet Union or abroad, for the applicable Soviet conflict of
laws principle states that "the form of foreign trade transactions
concluded by Soviet organizations and the procedure for their signing irrespective of place of conclusion of such transactions, shall
be determined by the legislation of the USSR."" This is a strict
departure from the universally recognized principle of lex loci
contracti and is a perilous trap into which an unwary foreign businessman may fall.
Under article 48 of the R.S.F.S.R. Civil Code, any transaction
that does not conform to legal requirements is invalid and requires
restitution by the parties for goods received under the transaction,
unless other consequences are required by statute. Additional provisions of the Civil Code that prescribe formalities for foreign trade
transactions include article 3, which specifically states that
"foreign trade relations are governed by the special foreign trade
legislation of the USSR and by the general civil legislation of the
USSR and the RSFSR;" 5 article 45, which provides that the
"[flailure to observe the formalities for an extended trade transaction as well as the failure to observe the procedure for the signature invalidates the transaction."" Further, article 564 addresses
itself to the authority of foreign corporations to conclude trade
contracts inside the Soviet Union, namely, that "[f]oreign enter83. Id. at 306. At 301-16 Pisar discusses the detailed formalities relative to the
creation and performance of agreements with Soviet FTO's.
84. U.S.S.R. F.P. Civ. L., art. 125 in [1968] 2 Sbor. Zak. S.S.S.R. 398. This
rule corresponds with R.S.F.S.R. GnAzH. KOD. (Civil Code) §565 (2) (1957).
85. U.S.S.R. F.P. Civ. L., art 3 in [1968] Sbor. Zak. S.S.S.R.
86. U.S.S.R. F.P. Civ. L., art 45 in [1968] Sbor. Zak. S.S.S.R.
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prises and organizations may without special permission effect
transactions in the RSFSR in the course of external trade, and the
accounting, insurance and other operations connected with it, with
Soviet external trade associations and other Soviet organizations
which have been given the right to effect such transactions,"8 7
while article 566 provides that "[t]he rights and duties of parties
under external trade transactions are defined by the law of the
place where they were concluded, unless the parties otherwise provide by their agreement. Soviet law decides in which place a transaction is [regarded as] effected.""8 In the case of a contract entered into through correspondence between the contracting parties, the place which, under Soviet law, will be considered the
proper locus contracti will be determined by article 162 of the
R.S.F.S.R. Civil Code, which provides that "when an offer to conclude a contract indicates a time-limit for an answer, the contract
is deemed concluded if the person making the offer receives an
answer from the other party accepting the offer within the time
set."8 However, under article 163 "when such an offer is made in
writing [without a time-limit for acceptance] the contract is
deemed concluded if an acceptance is received within the time
normally necessary for such receipt."" In short, the locus contracti
is considered to be the place where the offeror receives the offeree's
acceptance which usually is at the offeror's domicile." There is no
87. The principle promulgated in article 564 of the R.S.F.S.R. Civil Code
gives currency to the provision of article 12 of a March 11, 1931 Decree of the
Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. entitled The Procedure Governing the Conduct of Soviet ForeignTrade Operations by ForeignCorporationson the Territory
of the USSR, [1931] 24 Sbor. Zak. S.S.S.R. Item 197. The Decree generally

provides that a foreign corporation may engage in foreign trade business in the
Soviet Union only with the express permission of the Government, but article 12
waives any such requirement for a special permission if the business being conducted by the foreign corporation entails only trade negotiations or the conclusion
of isolated trade contracts that do not entail establishment of a permanent business operation in the Soviet Union.

88. U.S.S.R. F.P. Civ. L., art 566 in [1968] Sbor. Zak. S.S.S.R.
89. U.S.S.R. F.P. Civ. L., art 162 in [1968] Sbor. Zak. S.S.S.R.
90. U.S.S.R. F.P. Civ. L., art 163 in [1968] Sbor. Zak. S.S.S.R.
91. R.S.F.S.R., 1964 GRAz. KOD. (Civil Code) art. 165 provides that an answer from the offeree agreeing to make a contract on different terms from those
proposed in the original offer is to be treated simultaneously as a refusal of the
offer and a counter-offer.
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doubt that these numerous detailed regulations place a heavy burden on the prospective foreign businessman to know and insist
upon full compliance with Soviet law in all his transactions with
a Soviet FTO.
2. Scope of FTO authority.-The Soviet FTO's are subject to
very stringent ultra vires rules. The FTO is considered a special
creature of the state with its constituent instrument defining its
purpose and authority. An unauthorized act by an FTO is invalid
ab initio. Specifically, two provisions of the R.S.F.S.R. Civil Code
address themselves to the issue of unauthorized acts: under article
49, any transaction effected with an object contrary to the interests
of the State or against public policy is invalid, whereas under
article 50 a transaction concluded by a legal entity in contradiction
to the purposes specified in its charter, or in the general statute
on Foreign Trade Organizations of the given type, shall be invalid.
Therefore, to determine whether an act is ultra vires or not, one
shall look not only to the charter of the FTO in question but also
to other Soviet statutes and acts that may govern the transaction.
Thus, in practical terms, the foreign party is required to comply
strictly with procedure in dealing with a Soviet FTO, for even
when the FTO misrepresents or perhaps misunderstands the scope
of its authority, the contract is considered ab initio.
E. Summary-Legal Status of FTO's
In summarizing the legal status of the FTO, it should be noted
that the FTO is "an economic organization, a legal person and a
body autonomous in business transactions. At the same time, pursuant to law, the [FTO] is unconditionally subject to the directives of the Ministry [of Foreign Trade] which, in accordance with
9' 2
the Constitution of the USSR, has authority over foreign trade.
Because of the principle of state monopoly of foreign trade and
because of the eminent position occupied by foreign trade in the
overall conduct of Soviet foreign policy, the FTO is subject to strict
procedural requirements and ultra vires rules in its contractual
dealings with foreign enterprise. The general principle of lex loci
contracti is sufficient for domestic Soviet trade, but not in the area
92. Award of the FTAC on the claim filed by Jordan Investments, Ltd., an
Israeli company against the combine Soiuzneftexport, 53 Am. J. INT'L L. 789, 803
(1959).
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of foreign trade where it may be forced to yield to a compelling
state interest, which to the Soviet legal mind, to hold otherwise
would be tantamount to an unacceptable compromise of Soviet
3
state sovereignty.1
IV.

MISCELLANEOUS BARRIERS TO IMPROVED TRADE RELATIONS WITH
THE SOVIET UNION

In addition to having a centralized economy, the Soviet Union
is also a closed society. While the first factor is directly responsible
for certain legal barriers to foreign trade, the second factor-the
closed society-has resulted in a series of indirect, but nevertheless, serious and far-reaching restrictions on improved trade relations with the Soviet Union. This section discusses restrictions on
foreign trade operations in the Soviet Union.
A.

Strict Soviet Supervision of the Internal Movement by
Foreigners

For a combination of reasons, the Soviet Government restricts
the movement of all aliens and stateless persons within the Soviet
Union. Usually, these individuals are restricted to the major cities
such as Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev, and a permit is required for
them to move from one major city to another. Not only do violations of these domestic movement rules constitute a serious administrative offense but they are also viewed as criminal acts
under certain circumstances. Article 197-1 of the 1961 R.S.F.S.R.
Criminal Code provides:
The malicious violation by foreigners and persons without citizenship of the rules for movement on the territory of the USSR, that
93. A detailed analysis of the Soviet Conflict of Laws principles pertaining to
foreign trade operations can be found in Lunts, Vneshnetorgovaia KupliaProdazha-NormySovetskogo Kollizionnogo Prava, Otnosiashchiesiak Kontrak-

tam Po Eksporty i Importy Tovarov (Foreign Trade Sales and Purchases-Norms
of Soviet Conflict of Laws Relative to Contracts on the Export and Import of
Goods), Soy. Y.B. INT'L L. 261-76 (1960). The conflict-of laws principle regulating
trade between a Soviet FTO and the trading organizations of the COMECON
countries are different from those that regulate trade between the Soviet Union
and Western countries. In the case of intraCOMECON trade the applicable prin-

ciples are assembled in The General Conditions For the Delivery of Goods Within
Comecon, adopted in 1958. See Lunts, Id.
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is, a change of place of residence, a visit to points not stated in
USSR entry visas, or a deviation from a route of a journey stated in
travel documents, committed without special permission thereof, if
such persons have previously been twice subjected to administrative
exaction for violation of the stated rules, shall be punished by deprivation of freedom for a term not exceeding one year or by correctional tasks for the same term, or by a fle not exceeding 50
rubles. 4
The businessman, by the .nature of his operations, often acts
spontaneously and requires freedom of movement, not only inside
the country where he conducts his business, but, as often is the
case, across state frontiers. The Soviet visa regulations require that
if a businessman who resides in Moscow wishes to travel to Leningrad or Kiev or Tiflis, he must obtain a permit from the local police
authority. If he is driving, the police permit usually details the
route along which he must travel and locations where he may make
resting stops. It is much easier to regulate his movements if he is
flying since the airline ticket counter will normally request to see
his police permit before selling him a ticket. The same rule applies
if for any reason the businessman wishes to make a brief business
visit to any point outside the Soviet Union. There is no doubt that
a well-intentioned businessman will make an effort to comply with
these laws, but such tight regulation of movement within the country will undoubtedly have a chilling effect on the operational freedom of the prospective businessman.
B.

Housing Problems

The second barrier is posed by the acute housing shortage in the
Soviet Union, which has three types of home ownership-state,
cooperative-collective farm, and personal ownership.5 Under article 25 of the Fundamental Principles of Civil Legislation of the
U.S.S.R. and the Union Republics, as well as under article 10 of
the U.S.S.R. Constitution, a personal house is designed to satisfy
the personal convenience of the owner and as such it "may not be
used to derive unearned income."9 6 This means that the private
94.

All citations to the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code are to Professor Berman's

translation. See H. Brmirq, Sovuwr CPmqAL LAW AND PROCEDUE-THE RSFSR
CODES (2d ed. 1972).
95. KONST.arts. 5, 10.

96.

F.P.Civ.L. art. 25.
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Soviet citizen cannot, even if he so wishes, rent his house or portions thereof to an American businessman for whatever purpose.
Similarly, the property of a collective farm, a cooperative
organization, or of any other social organization may not be placed
at the disposal of a foreign businessman. Under the provisions of
articles 23 and 24 of Fundamental Principles of Civil Legislation
of the U.S.S.R., the property of these social organizations may be
put only to such uses that correspond with the aims of the organization, and invariably, renting such property to a private foreign
business will be incompatible with such aims.
These limitations leave the foreign business with only one option-i.e. to find a suitable state-owned building in which to locate
its offices. Unfortunately, the search for office space in Moscow or
Leningrad can take up to two years. Even when one is found the
accommodation is not often the best that could be hoped for,
since, as a general rule, ground floor accommodations are denied
to foreign businesses, which often find themselves assigned to
upper level quarters where members of the public cannot casually
drop in. Thus, the implication is that the foreign businessman in
search of office space in the Soviet Union is totally at the mercy
of the Soviet Government whose fullest cooperation is a conditio
sine qua non for obtaining even a modest accommodation. In anticipation, or rather in recognition, of some of the difficulties connected with locating office space in the Soviet Union, the United
States in article 6 of the 1972 Trade Agreement extracted a pledge
from the Soviet Government to make a good faith effort to help
United States businessmen in need of accommodations. 7
C.

Lack of Commercial Advertising Facilities

Another obvious obstacle to improved trade links with the Soviet
97. An agreement has been concluded with the Soviet Union that would enable a Western concern, the Occidental Petroleum Corporation of America, to
build an international trade center in Moscow. It is expected that upon completion of the center (which will have four buildings of 20-25 floors including a 600room hotel, 625 apartments for foreign businessmen, an auditorium, exhibition
pavillion, shops, theaters, concert hall, restaurants, swimming pool and a 600-car
garage) it will house most Western businesses and thus alleviate to a great extent
the present helplessness of United States businessmen who are looking for adequate accommodations in the Soviet capitol. Wall Street J., April 22, 1974, at 5,

Col. 1.
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Union is the lack of commercial advertising facilities. Since domestic Soviet businesses have never felt the need to persuade consumers to buy their products, the Soviet Union has not developed a
system of commercial advertising such as one inevitably finds with
competitive salesmanship. The American businessman, who looks
upon commercial advertising as an integral part of his operations,
feels frustrated when he is informed that he cannot advertise his
goods in the Soviet Union. One possible method, however, by
which the United States businessman can advertise his goods is to
include fact sheets in the package along with the goods, and as long
as these fact-sheets do not carry any political materials, the Soviet
Government will not prohibit them. 8
D.

Lack of Direct Contacts Between United States Businessmen
and Soviet Consumers

An ideal business atmosphere permits direct links between producers and consumers. Market research helps the producers know
what the consumers want and enables them to adapt to those
needs. In the Soviet Union, however, such direct links are not
possible. The FTO is interposed between the foreign businessman
on the one hand and the Soviet primary producers, domestic
wholesalers or general consumers on the other. This, of course,
means that the foreign businessman does not know exactly how
these recipients are reacting to his commodities.
Similarly, a foreign importing company has no way of communicating the needs of its clients to the responsible Soviet primary
producers. All such communications must be channeled through
the FTO, which in some instances "sanitizes" them before passing
them on. All indications are that even some officials in the Soviet
Union would like to see a loosening of this bureaucratic interposition between the foreign trader and the Soviet consumer. At the
23rd Congress of the CPSU, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin, in
effect, called for a relaxation of the present arrangement so that
the foreign trader can have a freer access to Soviet primary produ9
cers.0
98. There are indications that the Soviet Union is gradually loosening its
restrictions on commercial advertising by permitting a few politically innocuous
advertisements on a selective and experimental basis. However, massive commer-

cial advertisement in the Soviet Union is still a long way off.

99. Kosygin, The Directives of the 23rd CPSU Congress For the Five Year
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Bad Image of the Yankee Trader in the Soviet Union

Among the many barriers to enhanced trade relations with the
Soviet Union is the traditionally bad image that the American
trader has in the minds of Soviet citizens. Despite detente and the
well-publicized determination of the Soviet Government to trade
with the United States, the Yankee trader, to the average Russian,
is still a ruthless, profit-mongering, unscrupled, economic animal.
This image of the American businessman sometimes conveys the
impression that the United States capitalist would seize any available opportunity to restore capitalism in the Soviet Union, and
naturally, the Soviet Government does little to correct this slanted
image. The result is that the Soviet citizen enjoys American products whenever he finds them but is still suspicious of the motives
that propelled the American businessman into the Soviet market.
F. Lack of Secretarialand Other Services
The scarcity of secretarial and other administrative services in
the Soviet Union is among the many operational inconveniences
that the American businessman must endure. As a result of the
lack of an open labor market from which the foreigner can recruit
needed services, coupled with both the official Soviet policy of
discouraging direct contacts between its citizens and foreign businessmen, and the Soviet Government's need to infiltrate the local
offices of foreign businesses, the Soviet Government insists that all
requests by foreign businessmen for local secretarial, administrative and other service personnel should be directed to an appropriate government agency, which in turn recruits such persons and
assigns them to the respective foreign businesses. Since these staff
employees are selected by the State, the foreign businessman is
often wary of their presence, feeling that they have been placed by
the Government to monitor their operations. These fears may or
may not be justified, but the fact remains that business cannot
prosper under such an atmosphere of mutual distrust.
G.

Unavailabilityof the Services of a Local Attorney

Another obstacle is the difficulty of obtaining the services of a
Economic Development Plan of the U.S.S.R. for 1966-1970, N.Y. Times, April 6,
1966, at 1, col. 5.
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local attorney in the Soviet Union. Even if a Western businessman
has sufficient legal advice from Western experts on Soviet law,
there is still the need to retain a local attorney. Under article 7,
paragraph 2 of the 1972 Trade Agreement:
[E]ach Government shall ensure that corporations, stock companies, and other industrial or financial commereial organizations including foreign trade organizations, domiciled and regularly organized in conformity to the laws in force in the other country shall have
the right to appear before courts of the former, whether for the
purpose of bringing an action or of defending themselves against
one, including but not limited to, cases arising out of or relating to
transactions contemplated by this Agreement.1"
This right, however, cannot be fully realized unless the American
businessman can avail himself of the services of local counsel.
Perhaps to ameliorate this problem the Soviet Government should
consider establishing an FTO that would specialize in rendering
legal services to foreign corporations operating in the Soviet Union.
H.

The Language Problem

An American businessman who cannot speak the Russian language is at a distinct disadvantage. Obvious language problems
aside, differences in nuance and convention often create misunderstandings. For example, when a Soviet trade representative says,
"I'll study a proposal," he means no, while if he is interested in
the offer he will suggest modifications or make a counteroffer immediately.
To conduct serious business negotiations through an interpreter
is not an easy task, and at first, would tend to dampen the interest
of a prospective United States businessman. With adequate preparation, however, the problem of translation can be resolved, but
this does not remove the chilling effect on foreign businessmen
contemplating doing business in the Soviet Union.
I.

Joint Ventures in the Soviet Union

Even though the Soviet Union is willing to trade with the United
States and despite the fundamental concessions that the Soviet
Union has already made, there is a limit to Soviet concessions in
100.

1972 Trade Agreement, art. 7, 2.
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their commercial dealings with Americans. One form of operation,
which the Soviets are not willing to enter, is the establishment of
joint ventures with American corporations. The Soviet Government has expressed its sentiments on the propsects of such joint
ventures, clearly precluding foreign involvement in Soviet domestic projects.' 0 ' Thus, the message is clear that the present prospects
for United State-Soviet joint ventures are null.
While there are numerous obstacles to improved United StatesSoviet trade, there are additional problems, which have been at
least partially resolved by the 1972 Trade Agreement such as (1)
the method of payment for United States goods (traditionally, the
issue has been whether or not the Russians will be willing to pay
in convertible currency rather than in kind), (2) the potential for
the repatriation of capital gains from the Soviet Union, (3) the
question of arbitration of disputes over the interpretation or application of a trade agreement, (4) the threat of expropriation by the
Soviet Government,1 2 and (5) the question of prompt, adequate,
and effective compensation in the event of nationalization.
V.

CONCLUSION

After 57 years of Soviet-American history, trade relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are at their best
today, with 1972 marking the beginning of a new era, in terms of
both the actual volume of trade and in the breaking down of the
traditional barriers that had restricted trade between the two
101. For an indication of the current Soviet attitude toward United StatesSoviet joint ventures see interview with Nikolai S. Patolichev, Soviet Minister of
Foreign Trade, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., March 18, 1974, 59, 62.
102. It is doubtful whether the 1972 Agreement per se is an absolute guarantee
against Soviet nationalization of private investments in that country. Any such
unilateral takeover of American private property may be justified by the Soviet
Government under the national security clause of article 8 of the 1972 Trade
Agreement. Resort to nationalization of foreign property is certainly a political
measure which cannot be fully regulated by a legal instrument. For a brief analysis of the prevalent Soviet Government attitude toward nationalization under
international law see Osakwe, Nationalization,2 ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 29, at
464-65.
Even if nationalization is not carried out, requisition of such private alien
property may be necessitated by Soviet public interest. For details on Soviet law
of requisition see Osakwe, Requisition, 2 ENCLYCLOPEDIA, supra note 29, at 58384.
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countries. With the signing of the 1972 Trade Agreement, the flow
of trade, which had fluctuated since 1935,113 has increased at a
constant rate and appears to be of a permanent nature. The new
spirit of detente seems to have overcome the sporadic antagonism
that characterized United States-Soviet trade relations since 1951
when the Soviet Union was denied most-favored-nation status in
the American market.' 4 Nevertheless, under article 1 of the 1972
Trad6 Agreement both parties promised to grant on a reciprocal
basis a most-favored-nation status thereby eliminating a serious
source of contention. This provision, however, requires congressional action by the United States, for under the 1962 Trade Expansion Act the President is prevented from extending favorable
tarriff rates or duty free treatment to any communist countries,
except Yugoslavia and Poland, without congressional approval."'
Since the signing of the 1972 Trade Agreement, the Executive has
continually sought most-favored-nation status for the Soviet
Union but to no avail.' 1 It appears, however, that a workable compromise over the Trade Reform Act will be reached in Congress,' 7
103. The first trade agreement between the United States and the Soviet
Union was signed in 1935 thanks to the diplomatic breakthrough in United
States-Soviet relations in 1933. See Commercial Relations Agreement with
USSR, July 13, 1935, 49 Stat. 3805 (1935), E.A.S. No. 81.
104. Under the 1935 Trade Agreement the Soviet Union was granted MFN
status but only to be denied that status in 1951 (i.e. after the outbreak of the
Korean War). The Trade Agreement Extension Act of 1951, ch. 141, §5, 65 Stat.
73 granted the President power to terminate the existing trade agreement and this
was done on December 23, 1951.
105. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, §1861 (a), 19 U.S.C §1801 et seq. (1970).
106. A major obstacle to the granting of MFN to the Soviet Union has been
the Jackson Amendment to the Trade Reform Act of 1973 [H.R. 6767, 93rd Cong.,
1st Sess., §504 (1973)], which seeks to predicate the granting of MFN to the
Soviet Union upon that government's relaxation of its emigration policy.
107. The Wall Street Journal recently reported that a behind-the-scene agreement has been reached between the Ford Administration and the anti-detente
forces in the Senate [these generally include Senators Henry Jackson (D. Wash.),
Abraham Ribicoff (D., Conn.), and Jacob Javits (R., N.Y.), all of whom seem to
have the strong backing of AFL-CIO's George Meaney] under which the President would be permitted at least one year in which to grant various trade concessions to the Soviet Union while seeking assurance that the Soviet Union liberalizes its emigration policies toward Soviet Jews. Such a compromise would mean
that Senate approval of the trade legislation (without the Jackson Amendment)
is almost inevitable. See Wall Street J., Aug. 16, 1974, at 11, col. 6.
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insuring the viability of the 1972 Trade Agreement.
Assuming that the Trade Agreement becomes effective, one
should remember that, at best, it represents only a legal bridge
between the domestic foreign trade laws of the two sovereigns. The
guarantees provided in the agreement will eliminate some of the
legal complications of doing business with the Soviet Union,"" but
as any seasoned businessman knows, guarantees per se are not
enough. The major problem of trading with an unorthodox nation,
like the Soviet Union, lies in the extra-legal hazards connected
with such a venture. These hazards have not been and cannot be
totally removed by an intergovernmental trade agreement. Only a
prolonged period of peaceful trade between the two countries will
build the requisite mutual trust. One can only hope that with time
the Soviet Union will allow freer trade with the West, and particularly with the United States, but until this time comes, it will only
be reasonable for the prospective American businessman to realize
that there are still certain inherent risks in doing business with the
Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union wants to trade with the United States, but at
the same time it welcomes only the strict law-abiding businessman. Ignorance of Soviet laws can lead to a host of unpleasant
repercussions for the American businessman. It may lead to the
unenforceability or invalidity of a trade contract; it may result in
ignominious expulsion from the Soviet Union with or without for0 9 of one's business
feiture"
investments and, possibly, it might even
lead to criminal prosecution and, upon conviction, to possible imprisonment. The only advice one can give to an American contemplating doing business in the Soviet Union is to know the scope of
the authority of your Soviet opposite number, obey the local laws
and customs and while in the Soviet Union not engage in any
108. It should be pointed out that for each of these obstacles posed on the
Soviet side of the trade barrier there are corresponding American restrictions on
trade with the Soviet Union. These United States restrictions take the form of
import restraints, credit limitations, strategic export restrictions, denial of MFN
status, etc. For details on United States perspectives on United States-Soviet
trade law see PisAR, supra note 16.
109. For a general discussion of the Soviet law on the forfeiture of property as
a sanction for breach of the law by its owner see Osakwe, Forfeiture, I
ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 29, at 288-90.
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political activities that would create doubts in the minds of the
Soviet authorities as to the sincerity of your professed business
motives.

